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political parties and understood how measures and men might be combined in its light" (p. xiii).

I shall not stop to discuss the question, "Why was history ever written, anyway?" although I strongly suspect that it exists not for the sake of its facts, but for the sake of its ideas. Nor do I wish to insist that the way indicated is the only way by which to introduce students to philosophy. I do think it is a highly attractive way among a number of legitimate ways; that it is especially feasible for certain classes of students, and that it would be helpful as an auxiliary to any introduction course. My main desire is to emphasize by an illustration, which could well enough have been otherwise, certain conditions which any adequate introduction to philosophy should observe and which none adequately do observe,—principally the condition of connecting philosophy vitally with the student's average interest. Whether that interest be named as history, or literature, or football, or comic opera, or law is of course an important question of fact: but the paramount thing is to introduce him through his interests, whatever they are. This for two reasons: first, because a man's mind won't let you introduce him in any other way; and, second, because the very best service you can do for the good fortunes of metaphysics is to show that it is not an abstraction snatched from the upper air, but an abstraction from life; or, better still, an abstraction working in and through life and so no mere abstraction at all.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Studi Kantiani.* FELICE TOCCO. Palermo: Remo Sandron. Pp. 271.

It is indeed a relief, after having heard so much about the obscurity of Kant, to find a competent judge declaring and showing that after all Kant's writings are not so difficult to understand as is commonly supposed. Professor Tocco recognizes that "the author of critical philosophy, like all reformers, seems often obscure, because he does not always use the same words to express the same idea, and creates new terms or gives to the common term new and strange meanings." But he thinks at the same time that "this perplexity of language does not hinder us from clearly grasping the doctrine, many points of which, being beyond dispute, give us a true criterion for judging the rest" (p. 51). In fact, most of the dissensions about the meaning of Kant's philosophy depend merely on the contrasting systems of his interpreters, who mistake their criticisms for internal contradictions of the Kantian thought, as it happens, for example, with Volkelt

and Cantoni. To arrive at a truly impartial and objective appreciation of Kant's "Critique," it is necessary first of all to distinguish sharply between exposition and criticism; and it is this which makes of Professor Tocco perhaps the most lucid and acute interpreter of Kant, and of his "Kantian Essays" a masterpiece of critical work.

Professor Tocco has no difficulty in calling idealism Kant's philosophy, as indeed the author himself named it, but with the condition that the word "critical" should be added, to distinguish it from all other forms of idealism with which it might be confused. And this addition means that in the theoretical and also in the practical field it is impossible to do without something given (*il dato*). For in the theoretical field the datum is the material, which must be arranged according to the categories, and in the practical field it is the moral conscience or the moral life, born in the bosom of humankind long before philosophers began to discuss its foundations (p. xiv). In another place (p. 131) our author declares that the name idealism could not be more unfortunate, and that it is ill-applied to the Kantian theory: "the spirit of idealism—he says—has nothing to do with the 'Critique.'" The one denies or doubts the existence of external things; the other does not deny nor doubt, but only asserts that by means of our knowledge founded on experience we can not go to the bottom of things. The one distinguishes between internal and external experience, and ascribes to the first a greater certainty than to the second; the other, regardless of privileges, believes that both experiences, being equally given, have the same value, and for the same reason that one does not doubt the former, one must not doubt the latter. Lastly, the one believes that beyond experience there may be a superior knowledge, more certain and more evident; the other maintains that beyond experience we can have no theoretical knowledge (p. 130). Indeed, no greater contrast could exist between idealism, be it that of Descartes, or Berkeley, or Hegel, and Kantism, with its anti-mystical and anti-dogmatical character; and Kant was right in calling his doctrine an *empirical realism*, although from another point of view he calls it a *transcendental idealism*: empirical realism, because the matter of phenomena is not posited by mind, but given to it; transcendental idealism, because only that becomes a subject of knowledge which can be worked upon by the synthetical activity of mind, that is to say the formal relations of the elements given in experience. Only in this sense, *i. e.*, from an epistemological point of view, can the word idealism be used to denote Kant's Critique; but, as the term has always been applied to denote a metaphysical system, in the case of Kant it is certainly misleading. For how can a philosophical theory be called idealistic, which, like that of Kant, has such a decidedly dualistic character? Idealism believes that we can know absolute reality, and Kantism declares unknowable the thing in itself; idealism asserts the identity of thought and reality, and Kantism distinguishes between form and matter; idealism sees in sensation and understanding only a difference of degree, and Kantism affirms that there is between them an insuperable gulf, that the understanding finds in external or internal feeling an unsurpassable limit,

an irresoluble residuum, which is not *produced* by it, but *given* to it. These three dualisms, metaphysical between phenomena and noumena, logical between form and matter, psychological between sense and understanding, which constitute the essential foundations of the Critique, are the negation of every kind of idealistic philosophy.

But, if Kant's Critique is essentially anti-idealistic, is it also true that rationalism and dogmatism have no place in it? No doubt, ontological metaphysics has never had more formidable opponent than Kant; no philosopher has ever inveighed more strongly than he against the perversions of the *perversa ratio* and the indolence of the *ignava ratio*; and all the "Critique" is a vigorous challenge against the dogmatic rationalism of the old schools. Still, while it would be an exaggeration to affirm with Professor Paulsen that Kant's philosophy is mere rationalism, nevertheless it can not be denied that dogmatic apriorism occupies a large place in the "Critique." Kant simply removed the center of philosophical inquiry from the object to the subject, from the things observed to the observer; and so, while he drove out dogmatism from metaphysics, he left it standing in the theory of knowledge. The confusion between the metaphysical and the epistemological point of view is the true cause of all dissensions regarding the real character of Kant's philosophy, and of the extraordinary assertion of Professor Paulsen, that Kant—the great opposer of Leibnitzianism—was nothing else but a less genial, although more rigid and more systematic Leibnitz! And when Professor Tocco asserts that Kant's philosophy is no more rationalism than sensualism, he is quite right so far as regards metaphysics, but wrong so far as regards the Kantian theory of knowledge, and even his lucid and acute criticisms show that the old dogmatic spirit was not at all dead in the great thinker of Königsberg. In fact, it has been the task of the followers of Kant to apply to their last consequences their master's principles, and to expel forever from his theory the last survivals of dogmatic rationalism. It was no doubt these survivals which prepared the way to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and although it is quite false to assert with Kuno Fischer that if not the letter, yet the spirit of Kantism must be interpreted in the sense of absolute idealism; and that those philosophers are the true continuators of Kant, because—as Professor Tocco justly remarks (p. 160)—nothing is more contrary to absolute idealism than the theory of the noumenon, which puts a limit to the constructive activity of spirit; nevertheless, Kant's apriorism was certainly liable to be interpreted idealistically. So it naturally happened that Kantian philosophy, which was the negation of every kind of metaphysics, of every knowledge aiming to go beyond the limits of experience, appeared like a preparation for the new metaphysic of spirit, which according to Hegel was to occupy the place of the metaphysic of substance. In consequence, the followers of Kant, while combating absolute idealism, were naturally led to a criticism of their master's pure forms of knowledge, and to an attempt to break the vicious circle in which Kant involved himself by asserting that our cognitions are true because they are founded

on the *a priori* of the categories, and that the categories are true because they are the foundation of knowledge. As a natural development of Kantian thought, subjective apriorism had to submit to the same critical inquiry, by which Kant had shown the inanity and impossibility of objective apriorism.

It has been remarked that this critical development of Kant's theory has led to the negation of Kantism. And indeed some neo-Kantians have left standing very little of Kant, by removing even some of his most fundamental doctrines. So Professor Tocco criticises the apriority of space and time as interpreted by Kant. It is impossible to admit, he remarks, between the matter and the form of sensuous cognition such a gulf that the one comes all from outside and the other all from inside, for if it were so, nothing would exclude that the matter of internal sense were given in the spatial form, and the matter of external sense in the temporal form. Sensuous perception constitutes an homogeneous whole, and between its two elements there can not exist an absolute separation. Thus the form, far from being something purely subjective, is required by the object itself: it must begin in the datum, it can not derive exclusively from mind (p. 42). Obviously this means that the opposition established by Kant between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is not true. While the analytical proof of the apriority of space fails for want of a psychological theory of sensation, the transcendental proof fails because the necessity of mathematics, which is completely based on the possibility of construction, does not at all imply that apriority. The possibility of construction depends only on the faculty which our mind possesses of isolating our representation of space, of abstracting it from the sensuous content with which it is developed. This power of abstraction, possessed solely by the human mind, is the only *a priori* existing, and on it is founded the apriority of mathematics (p. 44).

What has been said of the forms of sensuous intuition applies also to the categories. These are not preformed moulds, which mind imprints on phenomena, but they are a kind of activity, a function which transforms the data of intuition, of perception, in concepts. Here also the only existing *a priori* is the unifying activity of mind, which connects and distinguishes the manifold elements of sensibility (p. 127). This activity *a priori* is the fundamental condition of experience, but it is purely formal and empty, so that the various arrangements of phenomena must depend on the phenomena themselves (p. 106). The necessity of causation, for example, is not to be found, as some critics think, exclusively in the category, which is a merely subjective condition, but both in the category and in the phenomenon. This, says Professor Tocco (p. 105), is the true interpretation of Kant's thought, and that which answers best to the spirit of the "Critique." But does not Kant again and again affirm that the principle of causation must be purely *a priori*, for, if it came from experience, it could not be absolutely necessary and universal? The mere possibility of nature depends on certain laws, which exist *a priori*. No doubt, according to Kant, the subjective succession in our apprehension

must come from the objective succession of the phenomena, but the rule, which makes the order of the successive perceptions necessary, derives from mind. "It is true," he says, "that the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the succession of events, as a concept of cause, becomes possible only when we have used it in experience, but, as the condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, it was nevertheless the foundation of all experience, and consequently preceded it *a priori*." This seems to show that Kant's *a priori* can not be considered as merely an activity of mind, and that the necessary rules, or laws, which make nature possible, are in fact original laws which precede experience. And indeed how could we ascribe universality and necessity to those laws, if it required some *a posteriori* element to arrive at them? If the concepts and principles of the understanding were not purely *a priori*, we could have no certain knowledge of phenomena, which are only appearances of the true reality; and the opposers of Kant could rightly ask: how can you boast of establishing the necessity and universal validity of the laws of nature, if you do not and can not absolutely know the real causes of phenomena? Such an objection has no meaning against Kant, for in his theory necessity is synonymous with apriority, and the laws of nature are laws of mind.

This does not prove that Kant was quite right, and that his interpreter is quite wrong, but it shows that the former is perfectly consistent and the latter inconsistent, in so far as he has not examined all the consequences of reducing the *a priori* to a mere activity of mind. This reduction represents a logical development of Kant's "Critique" and a natural result of psychological analysis, but—if Kantism is to survive—it requires a new examination and a new theory of the relation between form and matter, sense and understanding, phenomena and noumena, between what is given to mind and what comes from mind. That relation, as Kant has shown, is an insuperable necessity of thought; but Kant made the mistake of establishing a gulf where there is only a distinction, of considering as separate, elements which are intimately connected. Form does not exist apart from matter, nor understanding apart from feeling; and *the noumenon* is not something which exists over and above the phenomenon, but *is in the phenomenon itself*: it is that permanent reality which persists amidst the changing phenomenal appearances, that ultimate and irreducible element, which every metaphysician has finally to admit, and can never be brought under the clear forms of thought. So interpreted, the noumenon is no obstacle to the certain knowledge of phenomena, independently of all *a priori* forms of intuition and concepts of the understanding. And thus can critical philosophy be truly said, as Professor Tocco justly remarks, the only method which reconciles modern science with the moral ideals of humanity.

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*Der Monismus und Seine Ideale.* Dr. JOHANNES UNOLD. Leipzig: Th. Thomas. 1908. Pp. 160.

For the general philosophical reader, to whom "monism" may import many things, the title of the book might have gained in lucidity if quali-